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Thread: Lion Air Flight 610 Crash

  1. #331
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    “Thermocline of truth.“

    Good phrase. I’ve seen it in action on projects.

  2. #332
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    Using latin, veritas, a veritocline would be more classical, and the effect in organisations is more like a halocline than a thermocline, in my experience, and it’s fear more than truth, so maybe a timocline?
    sicut vis videre esto
    When we realize that patterns don't exist in the universe, they are a template that we hold to the universe to make sense of it, it all makes a lot more sense.
    Originally Posted by Ken G

  3. #333
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    This recent WSJ article is one of best I've read, in terms of the cockpit confusion (to which the operation of the MCAS contributed), incremental MCAS changes (many of which almost no one knew about), and the stupidity (no other word suffices) of relying so heavily on pilots being experienced enough to handle any emergency a failure of the MCAS could cause: The Four-Second Catastrophe: How Boeing Doomed the 737 MAX.

  4. #334
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    Quote Originally Posted by Jean Tate View Post
    This recent WSJ article is one of best I've read, in terms of the cockpit confusion (to which the operation of the MCAS contributed), incremental MCAS changes (many of which almost no one knew about), and the stupidity (no other word suffices) of relying so heavily on pilots being experienced enough to handle any emergency a failure of the MCAS could cause: The Four-Second Catastrophe: How Boeing Doomed the 737 MAX.
    I note subscription required to read it.
    sicut vis videre esto
    When we realize that patterns don't exist in the universe, they are a template that we hold to the universe to make sense of it, it all makes a lot more sense.
    Originally Posted by Ken G

  5. #335
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    Quote Originally Posted by profloater View Post
    I note subscription required to read it.
    Sorry about that.

    But weird ... I don’t have a subscription and was able to find, and read, the article ...

  6. #336
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    Quote Originally Posted by Jean Tate View Post
    Sorry about that.

    But weird ... I don’t have a subscription and was able to find, and read, the article ...
    The article (I think it's the same; perhaps it's an abridged version) also appears at https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/indep...cid=spartandhp

  7. #337
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    Quote Originally Posted by Geo Kaplan View Post
    The article (I think it's the same; perhaps it's an abridged version) also appears at https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/indep...cid=spartandhp
    Thanks i read that and, wow, what a hard hitting summary. Four seconds when you know what needs to be done is
    One thing and four seconds when it’s a confusing surprise, another. It’s actually quite shocking as a story of design and development with high stakes.
    sicut vis videre esto
    When we realize that patterns don't exist in the universe, they are a template that we hold to the universe to make sense of it, it all makes a lot more sense.
    Originally Posted by Ken G

  8. #338
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    Quote Originally Posted by Hornblower View Post
    My educated guess is that changing it to a tri-jet would have made it a different enough airplane that the need for new type certification for the crew would have been ruled out.
    I blew it but good with my choice of words. That should have been "the need for new type certification for the crew would have been a sure thing."

  9. #339
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    After reading the various reports so far, if i were a pilot, responsible for taking four second decisions when the kit breaks down, I would be really angry with Boeing right now for being kept in the dark, and asking “what else?”
    sicut vis videre esto
    When we realize that patterns don't exist in the universe, they are a template that we hold to the universe to make sense of it, it all makes a lot more sense.
    Originally Posted by Ken G

  10. #340
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    Check out this video by Juan Brown.
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JlocOX7tuU0
    If he is not mistaken we have a couple of troublesome phenomena here.

    1. The crews in the two crashes appear to have been bombarded to the point of confusion by a hodgepodge of bells and whistles, most of which were not pertinent to the unwanted trim changes.

    2. Many younger commercial pilots have not had much experience with the basic stick-and-rudder skills that are acquired with lots of hours in small planes without computer assist.

    See the video for his details.

  11. #341
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    Quote Originally Posted by Hornblower View Post
    Check out this video by Juan Brown.
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JlocOX7tuU0
    If he is not mistaken we have a couple of troublesome phenomena here.

    1. The crews in the two crashes appear to have been bombarded to the point of confusion by a hodgepodge of bells and whistles, most of which were not pertinent to the unwanted trim changes.

    2. Many younger commercial pilots have not had much experience with the basic stick-and-rudder skills that are acquired with lots of hours in small planes without computer assist.

    See the video for his details.
    Very interesting and indeed if that is taken seriously as an ergonomic challenge, which it is, the redesign will take some time. There are serious engineering design issues too, .as have been discussed here, but as in-the air france crash from high speed stall, confusion was a killer.
    sicut vis videre esto
    When we realize that patterns don't exist in the universe, they are a template that we hold to the universe to make sense of it, it all makes a lot more sense.
    Originally Posted by Ken G

  12. #342
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    Quote Originally Posted by profloater View Post
    Very interesting and indeed if that is taken seriously as an ergonomic challenge, which it is, the redesign will take some time. There are serious engineering design issues too, .as have been discussed here, but as in-the air france crash from high speed stall, confusion was a killer.
    This may not be confined to the Max.

  13. #343
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    Quote Originally Posted by Hornblower View Post
    This may not be confined to the Max.
    The cockpit confusion issue and the "flying the sim and not the plane" issue has been brewing in the commercial aviation industry for a while now, and was initially thought (and still is, to a degree) to be a component of the two 737 Max crashes. The final reports for Lion Air should be out soon, and I suppose the Ethiopian flight and I'll be interested to see if cockpit overload, or work overload, gets mentioned. Or if they just blame it all on MCAS.

    ETA: Looks like November for the Lion Air report.

    JAKARTA (Reuters) - The final report on the crash of a Lion Air Boeing 737 MAX jet that killed 189 people last year will be published in the first half of November, Indonesia’s civil aviation authority said on Wednesday [September 19].

    “The draft was already sent to the relevant parties on August 24, 2019,” KNKT spokesman Anggo Anurogo said in a statement. “The parties have 60 days to respond to the final draft.”

    Officials told Reuters in August that the draft would be sent to all parties involved, including Boeing, Lion Air, and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration.

  14. #344
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    It is certainly valuable to catalog all the contributing factors, to try to alleviate the problem. Still, it cannot be denied that at the end of the day, the MCAS did fly the plane into the ground. It literally gave commands to the wings that flew the plane into the ground, those commands did not come from the pilots. I don't see any way that is an excusable design.

  15. #345
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    Silly nitpick because I can't help myself: MCAS gave commands to the horizontal stabilizer, not the wings.

    Oh, and lots of systems on modern airplanes give commands that don't come directly from the pilot. Just not so inappropriately as MCAS.
    Cum catapultae proscriptae erunt tum soli proscript catapultas habebunt.

  16. #346
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    Quote Originally Posted by Trebuchet View Post
    Silly nitpick because I can't help myself: MCAS gave commands to the horizontal stabilizer, not the wings.
    I'm counting the tail as "wings", but I see your point.

    Oh, and lots of systems on modern airplanes give commands that don't come directly from the pilot. Just not so inappropriately as MCAS.
    It's pretty rare that they could give a command that flies the plane into the ground. They might fail to figure out what to do, and leave the pilot to figure it out, but they should never literally override the pilot in order to make the plane hit the ground. That's my point-- the first job of any automated system is to acquire enough information that you are certain the commands are better, or at least not much worse, than what a pilot would do. Any system that so completely fails to take into account obvious information that the pilot already knows (like how far you are from the ground, or what your airspeed is), yet overrides the pilot anyway, is a terrible design, without any other details being mentioned. There's a bleedin' computer on those planes, yet the only data the MCAS used to fly the plane into the ground was the input from one single sensor. Worse, data was available from another similar sensor, which the MCAS is simply not programmed to use. How anybody could think this is a rational use of the data available to the pilot and the onboard computer is completely beyond me, it's so obviously a cost-saving kludge that ended up costing much more in both money and lives. Is the lesson not obvious? Don't substitute good design with cost-saving kludges. And if one would replace good design with kludges, then one should not blame the pilots when it all goes south.

    In particular, I would stress that the killing aspect of the MCAS design was its default mode of immediately trimming the stabilizers when it is turned back on. If they had simply realized that pilots might want to turn MCAS off when it is malfunctioning, but might then find it impossible to trim the stabilizers manually (as they well know can happen, which is why they are trained to put the plane into a dive if they need to do it), then they should not make the MCAS engage immediately when turned back on. If they made it wait its normal wait time, then at least the pilots could cycle its power to get it to behave. But no, it comes on and immediately overrides the pilot, crashing the plane instantly when the altitude is low and the pilots are in a desperate state (of its own making).
    Last edited by Ken G; 2019-Oct-09 at 08:22 PM.

  17. #347
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    Recently I read an article, by an experienced pilot, that made a case that good pilots would have been able to recover from the Lion Air and Ethiopian MCAS over-rides (frustratingly, I can’t now find it now), whether they knew about MCAS or not. Further, that the demand for commercial pilots is so strong that a great many are, in reality, not good pilots but rather do well enough on sims.

    Also, a deep difference between Boeing and Airbus: Airbus is designing for more robust/human minimalized commercial aircraft, so the MCAS kind of thing becomes increasingly impossible.

  18. #348
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    Quote Originally Posted by Jean Tate View Post
    R
    Also, a deep difference between Boeing and Airbus: Airbus is designing for more robust/human minimalized commercial aircraft, so the MCAS kind of thing becomes increasingly impossible.
    Say what? For the past 20 or 30 years it's been Boeing saying that the pilot is ultimately in control. Airbus has given more control to the computers. Which ultimately means the pilot is less in control.
    I'm not defending Boeing, though I worked there. MCAS was a failure of just about everything I was taught there. I REALLY need some explanation of what you are saying.
    Cum catapultae proscriptae erunt tum soli proscript catapultas habebunt.

  19. #349
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    I found the article (link): "What Really Brought Down the Boeing 737 MAX?", by William Langewiesche, NY Times, 18 Sept 2019 with some updates.

    I was able to read the whole - quite long -article, but for some it may be behind a paywall; it has over 1400 comments.

    Yeah, my memory clearly isn't very good. For example, on Airbus vs Boeing design philosophy, here's a snippet (you should read the whole para):

    In the face of these changes, Boeing clung resolutely to its pilot-centric designs, but in Toulouse, France, the relative newcomers at the European consortium called Airbus were not nearly as shy. Led by an outspoken former military test pilot turned chief engineer named Bernard Ziegler, Airbus decided to take on Boeing by creating a robotic new airplane that would address the accelerating decline in airmanship and require minimal piloting skills largely by using digital flight controls to reduce pilot workload, ...
    Hope this clarifies things.

  20. #350
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    It sounds like Airbus is trying to make planes that don't need a good pilot to fly them, while Boeing is making planes that do require a good pilot but they aren't willing to give them the training to be good at flying them.

  21. #351
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken G View Post
    It sounds like Airbus is trying to make planes that don't need a good pilot to fly them, while Boeing is making planes that do require a good pilot but they aren't willing to give them the training to be good at flying them.
    I think that both would like to make planes that don't need a good pilot to fly them (as a passenger that would be my preference as well). I think in general though that what makes a "good" pilot is changing for both. Where it used to be that a good pilot was a person who had good situational awareness and the ability to control the flight surfaces and engines well, now it's really a person who is good at coordinating systems and managing checklists (though of course the checklist part was always part of it). Both Boeing and Airbus (and other manufacturers as well) have stall and ground proximity warnings, so clearly Boeing is not simply interested in making a plane that invites accidents if the pilot makes a mistake.
    As above, so below

  22. #352
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    Quote Originally Posted by Jean Tate View Post
    Recently I read an article, by an experienced pilot, that made a case that good pilots would have been able to recover from the Lion Air and Ethiopian MCAS over-rides (frustratingly, I can’t now find it now), whether they knew about MCAS or not.
    Though that is probably true (after, all the pilots the day before the Indonesian crash were able to regain control of the same aircraft), it's also true that even the same pilot, with the same conditions, will not always respond in the same way, and with two pilots there is always the interaction between them. So even a good pilot can have a bad day or make a dumb mistake, because pilots are human. For example, both pilots independently might be good pilots but may get into a disagreement that leads to a problem getting worse.
    As above, so below

  23. #353
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    Which is why it makes no sense to blame the pilots. Safety is about what happens 100 times out of 100, not 99 times out of 100.

  24. #354
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    Quote Originally Posted by Jean Tate View Post
    Further, that the demand for commercial pilots is so strong that a great many are, in reality, not good pilots but rather do well enough on sims.
    The things I could tell you about truck drivers from overseas. And thanx to smart phones, truckers don't even know what a CB radio is any more.

    I never thought I'd live to see that.

    You can have pilot centric designs that are stable. Airbus might wind up biting themselves.

  25. #355
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    Holy cow, it just keeps getting worse.
    Boeing is already on record that it is counting on getting approval for its grounded 737 Max to fly again by the end of this year. But that apparently became more difficult Friday after the FAA demanded that the aircraft maker explain why it did not disclose that some of its employees had concerns about the safety of the plane during the certification process in 2016.
    "Some of its employees" being pilots flying in the simulator in 2017 and already encountering problems.

    I'm SO glad I retired almost 10 years ago. I keep waiting to see the name of someone I worked with associated with this fiasco but maybe they all got out too.
    Cum catapultae proscriptae erunt tum soli proscript catapultas habebunt.

  26. #356
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    A side point I guess, but it always seems that machines not in use sort of decay.

    (In my mind as I just had to buy a new battery for my bike as I got lazy with keeping the old one topped up over winter (living at a place without outside power supply).)

    I'm sure they are doing maintenance on all those grounded 737's; but I presume they're going to have to do more than top up the fuel tanks to fly them again. (Let alone install the fixes.)


    Are there going to be safety issues from the dis-use?
    Measure once, cut twice. Practice makes perfect.
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  27. #357
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    I am too long out of the industry but many aircraft components are time limited both in calender time and flying hours so their airworthiness certificates can expire on the shelf. Lubrication can harden , alloys like age hardening rivets can have limited life, electronics (capacitors) dry out, so getting a long grounded plane back up can require maintenance and repair even though it has not flown. But I could be out of date for these Boeings.
    sicut vis videre esto
    When we realize that patterns don't exist in the universe, they are a template that we hold to the universe to make sense of it, it all makes a lot more sense.
    Originally Posted by Ken G

  28. #358
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    New Juan Brown video about the text messages.
    Cum catapultae proscriptae erunt tum soli proscript catapultas habebunt.

  29. #359
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken G View Post
    Which is why it makes no sense to blame the pilots. Safety is about what happens 100 times out of 100, not 99 times out of 100.
    It's no excuse. Saying a high quality pilot could have won a fight against your axe crazy plane is merely an admission you built an axe crazy plane.

  30. #360
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    Pretty much all of the time, they blame the dead guys. It's harder for them to defend themselves.
    Cum catapultae proscriptae erunt tum soli proscript catapultas habebunt.

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