V-E. In a civilization consisting of billions or tril-
lions of individual agents, how can one of them
exercise so much power without the help of others?
If the agents on whom that one relies organize and
stage a revolt, they should be able to divide the
resources and avoid a collapse, shouldn’t they?
Proposition 5.3:
The probability of successful
revolt against the α-agent decreases as the size
of civilization (in terms of cumulative value) in-
creases.
Proof:
An ideal revolt is a conflict between
the α-agent and the sum of all other agents in
a given civilization. Assuming the defensive and
offensive systems do not need their own agency
to function, the outcome of a conflict is only
determined by the value that each side is able to
spend on it. According to 3.4, the fraction of value
held by the α-agent increases as civilization grows.
Eventually its weight will surpass that of all other
agents put together, at which point a successful
revolt is impossible.
It is, indeed, possible until then, but, once the
growth resumes, the same dynamic from 3.4 also
continues, eventually returning the value distribu-
tion to the same shape.